This paper studies the impact of an unfunded social security system on the distribution of bequests in a framework where savings are due both by life cycle and by random altruistic motivations. We show that the impact of social security o n t h e distribution of bequests depends crucially on the importance of the bequest motive in explaining savings behavior. If the bequest motive is strong, then an increase in the social security tax raises the bequests left by altruistic parents. On the other hand, when the importance of bequests in motivating savings is su ciently low, the increase in the social security tax could result in a reduction of the bequests left by altruistic parents under some conditions on the attitude of individuals toward risk and on the relative returns associated with private saving and social security. Some implications concerning the transitional e ects of introducing an unfunded social security s c heme are also discussed.
Introduction
The e ects of the social security system both on capital accumulation and on wealth distribution have received a great deal of attention among economists. Since most studies have considered life cycle economies with non-altruistic agents, the e ects of social security on inheritances have been mostly neglected. This seems an important omission since there is substantial evidence that intergenerational transfers are crucial for understanding capital accumulation and wealth distribution in the US economy see, for instance, Kotliko and Summers, 1981 . This paper studies the impact of an unfunded social security system on the distribution of inheritances in a framework where savings are due both by life cycle and by random altruistic motivations. We show that the impact of social security on that distribution depends crucially on the importance of the bequest motive in explaining savings behavior. If the bequest motive is strong, then an increase in the social security tax raises the bequests left by altruistic parents. On the other hand, when the importance of bequests in motivating savings is su ciently low, the increase in the social security tax could result in a reduction of the bequests left by altruistic parents under some conditions. This paper develops a model where individuals save for altruistic and life-cycle motives that is simple enough to study distributional issues analytically. Individuals will live for two periods and they will work only during the rst period. When individuals are young, they save to nance their consumption during the second period of their life. Altruism is modeled as a uninsurable random shock on preferences as in Escolano 1992 and Dutta and Michel 1998 among others. However, in the latter paper individuals are assumed to live only for one period and all the savings arise from the bequest motive. Of course, by not allowing the coexistence of at least two generations in the same period, such a framework is not suitable to analyze the e ects of the inter-vivos transfer implicit in the pay-as-you-go PAYG social security system. In our model individuals face an idiosyncratic shock that determines whether they love their children or not. The shock on altruism implies in fact that the intertemporal discount rate of utility is a random variable. Individuals will save to nance both their second period consumption and the bequests in case they turn out to be altruistic.
We c haracterize the distribution of bequests at the steady state equilibrium and study how this distribution changes with the social security tax. In this economy, the bequest motive is operative for altruistic agents depending on the values of both the interest and the discount rate. If the bequest motive is not operative at the steady state equilibrium, social security does not a ect the long run distribution of bequests since this distribution remains degenerate at zero. However, when the bequest motive is operative, social security a ects the long run distribution of bequests. Whether it increases or decreases the size of altruistic bequests depends on the strength of the bequest motive as measured by the probability of being altruistic and on the return of social security relative to the return of capital.
We nd that bequests increase with the size of pensions when the bequest motive is operative in the steady state and the probability of being altruistic is su ciently high. Since an increase in pensions imposes higher mandatory transfers from the young to the old, altruistic parents nd optimal to increase the size of the bequests they leave to their children. In the limit case of a probability of being altruistic equal to one, the increase in bequests completely undo the intergenerational transfers imposed by the PAYG social security system, as it was shown by Barro 1974 . Therefore, when only a small subset of individuals are non-altruistic, a higher pension tax sparks o an increase of the wealth gap between children born in sel sh families and children born in altruistic households.
On the contrary, bequests can decrease with pension bene ts when the probability of being altruistic is su ciently low. More precisely, we prove that, if preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion and the return from saving is greater than the return of the social security system which is given by the rate of population growth, such a decrease of bequests takes place and, thus, the wealth gap between children born in sel sh families and children born in altruistic ones becomes smaller.
Another result of our paper concerns the transitional e ects of social security. As we h a ve said, the altruistic individuals of the economy could decide not to leave bequests in the steady sate, that is, the bequests motive could be non-operative under some parametric restrictions see Weil, 1987 . In this case, the introduction of an unfunded social security system could force altruistic individuals to leave some bequests so as to absorb the initial impact of the mandatory transfers inherent i n t h e social security system. Of course, non-altruistic individuals will remain leaving zero bequests. Therefore, the introduction of social security could induce a transitional dynamics characterized by inequality in the distribution of wealth at birth. Such e ect is just transitory since the bequests of all individuals will converge to zero in the long run.
Among the papers analyzing the impact of scal policies on the distribution of bequests, we mention the ones of Bevan and Stiglitz 1979, Becker and Tomes 1979, Atkinson 1980, and Davies 1986 . These authors focus on intragenerational redistributive policies and their e ects on wealth and income distribution. Our paper contributes to this literature with an analytical study on the e ects of a PAYG social security system on the distribution of altruistic bequests. Abel 1985 analyzes instead the impact of social security in a framework where bequests are accidental and only arise because of life time uncertainty. 1 He nds that social security reduces accidental bequests because it annuitizes the wealth of individuals. In his model the fraction of individual savings made compulsory by the social security is returned as a pension only if the corresponding individual survives. Therefore, thanks to this public provision of annuities, individuals will make less voluntary savings and thus accidental bequests will be smaller. Obviously, this results in a reduction of 1 Other papers analyzing di erent e ects of social security under uncertain lifetimes are the ones of Eckstein et al. 1985 and Sheshinsky and Weiss 1981. the intracohort variance of wealth. Our approach consists instead on characterizing the impact of PAYG social security on the distribution of bequests when these are not accidental but altruistically motivated. In contrast to the result obtained with accidental bequests, such an impact could beambiguous in the long run when the bequest motive is operative.
On a related paper Karni and Zilcha 1989 examine the e ects of social security on income distribution. They emphasize the fact that, due to general equilibrium e ects, social security induces a decrease of the return of labor relative to the return of capital. This e ect leads to an increase of income inequality in their model because the only source of heterogeneity is an exogenous distribution of bequests or initial capital. On the contrary, our paper focuses on the e ect of social security on the distribution of bequests, which is not longer viewed as exogenous.
Finally, w e should point out that random altruism can be interpreted as a shock on the intertemporal discount rate of utility and that recently some authors have used models with stochastic discount factors see, for instance, Krusell and Smith 1998. Random discounting has proven a useful device for generating wealth heterogeneity in quantitative models.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the economic environment and the individuals' problem. Section 3 studies the dynamics of bequests and the operativeness of the bequest motive both in the short and in the long run. Section 4 shows the existence and uniqueness of the invariant distribution of bequests and characterizes this distribution. Section 5 focuses on the e ects of social security on the distribution of bequests when the bequest motive is not operative in a steady state, whereas Section 6 performs the comparative statics analysis for economies where the bequest motive is always operative for altruistic agents. Section 7 concludes the paper.
The Model
Let us consider an overlapping generations economy in discrete time with a continuum of individuals in each period. A generation of individuals with identical ex-ante preferences is born in each period and individuals live for two periods. At the end of the rst period of his life each agent has N 1 c hildren so that an individual is young when his parent is old.
When individuals become old, they realize if they love their children, that is, they know if they are altruistic or not. If an individual is altruistic, the indirect utility of each of his children appears as an argument in his utility function. That event occurs with probability 2 0; 1 : For the sake of simplicity, w e will assume that the total utility obtained by an altruistic old individual is the sum of the utility derived from his consumption when old and the sum of the indirect utilities of their direct descendants. Old individuals are sel sh with probability 1 , and, then, they derive utility only from their own consumption. Therefore, in this large economy a mass of individuals is altruistic whereas a mass 1 , turns to be sel sh. There are no markets to buy insurance against the risk of becoming altruistic towards children.
We will assume that the economy under consideration is an small open one with perfect capital mobility and where there is no labor mobility. This means that the interest rate is constant and equal to its international level. Let R 0 be the constant one-period gross rate of return on saving. The technology of this economy is represented by a production function with two inputs: labor and capital. Such a production function is strictly increasing, concave, and exhibits constant returns to scale. Both capital and labor markets are hired in perfectly competitive markets so that the rental prices of both inputs coincide with their respective marginal productivities. Therefore, given a xed international interest rate, the capital-labor ratio is constant and, thus, the marginal productivity of labor is also constant. Such a marginal productivity of labor is in turn equal to the real wage w in equilibrium.
Young individuals are endowed with a unit of labor time. They supply their labor endowment inelastically in exchange for the constant market wage w:Old individuals are retired.
There is a government that administrates a balanced PAYG social security system. Young individuals contribute to the system by paying a constant lumpsum tax P with 0 P w : Therefore, each old individual receives a pension bene t equal to N P :
The utility that an individual derives from his own consumption in each period is represented by a utility function u de ned on R ++ which is assumed to be bounded and twice continuously di erentiable with u 0 0; u 00 0 and to satisfy the Inada where c y is the consumption of a young individual, s is the saving, c s is the 1 When labor supply is inelastic, lump-sum social security taxes are equivalent to proportional taxes on wages since there is no distortion in the labor market. 2 Instead of assuming that u is bounded we could assume speci c functional forms that are not bounded but that are quite common in the literature. For instance, if we assume isoelastic preferences, uc = c 1, 1, with 0; then all the results of this paper are still true when the condition N R 1, 1 for bounded value functions holds. If uc = l n c ; then the corresponding condition is simply N 1:
Another commonly used utility function is the CARA uc = ,e , c with 0: All the main results of the paper apply for this function in spite of not satisfying the Inada condition at the origin.
consumption of a sel sh old individual, V y b; P is the value function of a young individual who has received a bequest b when the level of pensions is P;and V a s; P is the value function of an altruistic old individual who has saved the amount s in his rst period of life when the level of pensions is P:Note that the two w eak inequalities in the constraints imply that b , w + P we de ne c a = c a s; P and b 0 =bs; P as the policy functions for consumption of an altruistic old individual and bequest per capita, respectively. We also de ne the composite function gb; P bŝb; P; P which gives the bequest per capita left by an old altruistic individual who had received the transfer b from his parent when the pension remained unchanged at the level P.
The following lemma establishes a basic result about the existence of a unique solution to the previous programs. Its proof is omitted since it follows immediately from applying, for instance, Theorems 4.6-4.10 of Stokey and Lucas 1989 to program 2:3. The existence and the properties of the value function V y ; P follow directly from the existence and properties of the value function V a ; P through program 2:1 : Lemma 1. There exists a unique value function V a ; P associated with program 2:3 which is continuously di erentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave 2.7
The following lemma provides additional properties of the policy functions:
Lemma 2. The policy functionsĉ y ; P;ĉ s ; P;ĉ a ; P;ŝ; P are all strictly increasing. The policy functionb; P is non-decreasing and locally strictly increasing whenbs; P 0: Moreover, the function g; P is non-decreasing and locally strictly increasing when gb; P 0:
Proof. aŝ; P is strictly increasing. Let us proceed by contradiction. as follows from the concavity of both u and V a ; P. We get a contradiction by noticing that b 1 ,s 1 b 2 ,s 2 ; which is incompatible with the concavity o f u: bĉ s ; P is strictly increasing. Obvious from part a and the fact that c s b; P = Rŝb; P + N P : cĉ y ; P is strictly increasing. From the envelope condition 2:5 ; V 0 y b; P = u 0 c y b; P; and the concavity of both u and V y ; P; the result immediately follows. dĉ a ; P is strictly increasing. From the envelope condition 2:7 ; V 0 a s; P = u 0 c a s; P; and the concavity of both u and V a ; P; the result immediately follows.
eb; P is non-decreasing and strictly increasing whenbs; P 0: Assume that s 1 is an amount of saving for whichbs 1 ; P = 0 : Then, for every s 2 s 1 , we havebs 2 ; P 0 because of the non-negativity constraint on bequests. Therefore, bs 2 ; P bs 1 ; P: On the other hand, assume that s 1 is such thatbs 1 ; P 0: Then, condition 2:6 holds with equality and the concavity of both u and V y ; P yieldsbs 2 ; P b s 1 ; P for every pair s 2 s 1 : f g; P is non-decreasing and locally strictly increasing when gb; P 0:
Obvious from a and e.
The Dynamics of Bequests within a Dynasty
In this section we provide more properties of the function g; P de ning the bequest left by an altruistic individual as a function of the transfer he has received from his parent under a stationary pension system. Several cases arise depending on both the discount factor and the gross rate of return from saving R:
The next proposition shows that, when the real interest rate R , 1 i s l o wer than the discount rate Proof. Let b 0 be such that b 0 = gb; P 0: Then, we h a ve u 0 ĉ y b; P = R 1 , u 0 ĉ s b; P + u 0 ĉ a ŝb; P; P R u 0 c a ŝb; P; P u 0 ĉ a ŝb; P; P = V 0 y gb; P; P = u 0 ĉ y gb; P; P;
where the rst equality comes from substituting the envelope condition 2.7 into the rst order condition 2.4, the strict inequality comes from the fact thatĉ a ŝb; P; P ĉ s b; P when b 0 0 ; the weak inequality comes from the assumption that R 1, the second equality is just the rst order condition 2.6 when b 0 0; whereas the last equality is the envelope condition 2.5. Sinceĉ y ; P is strictly increasing and u is strictly concave, we get that gb; P b .
If gb; P = 0 for b 0; then it trivially follows that gb; P b : Finally, let b = 0: Since gb; P b for all b 0; the continuity of g; P on , ,w + P , R,N R ; 1 implies that lim b!0 gb; P = g0; P 0: Hence, the nonnegativity constraint on bequests allows us to conclude that g0; P = 0 :
The next proposition strengthens the previous one since it gives a su cient condition for the transfers to become zero after a nite history of altruistic individuals within a dynasty. Such a su cient condition is obtained by just making strict the weak inequality which w as assumed in Proposition 1, that is, the interest rate should be strictly lower than the discount rate of utility. Proof. Notice that V 0 y 0; P = u 0 c y 0; P = 1 , Ru 0 Rŝ0; P + N P + V 0 a ŝ0; P; P ;
where the rst equality is the envelope condition 2:5 while the second is the rst order condition 2:4: From Proposition 1; we know that g0; P = 0 so that the envelope condition 2:7 becomes V 0 a ŝ0; P; P = Ru 0 Rŝ0; P + N P :
Combining 3:1 and 3:2, and using the fact that R 1, we get V 0 y 0; P u 0 Rŝ0; P + N P :
De ne bP implicitly by V 0 y 0; P = u 0 RŝbP ; P + N P :
Note that bP 0 sinceŝ; P is strictly increasing and u is strictly concave.
Therefore, the following weak inequality holds for all b 2 0; b P :
V 0 y 0; P u 0 Rŝb; P + N P :
We can show next that gb; P = 0 for b 2 0; b P : We proceed by contradiction and assume instead that gb; P 0: Since both V y ; P and u are strictly concave, we h a ve that V 0 y 0; P V 0 y gb; P; P and u 0 Rŝb; P + N P , N g b; P u 0 Rŝb; P + N P :
These two inequalities, together with 3:4 ; imply that V 0 y gb; P; P u 0 Rŝb; P + N P , N g b; N P ; which according to the rst order condition 2:6 implies that gb; P = 0 ; and this is the desired contradiction.
To prove that gb; P 0 for b b P assume instead that gb; P = 0 t o get a contradiction. Such a contradiction is easily obtained since gb; P = 0 implies that V 0 a ŝ0; P; P Ru 0 Rŝb; P + N P ; as dictated by the rst order condition 2:6: On the other hand, b b P implies that V 0 a ŝ0; P; P R u 0 Rŝb; P + N P ;
3.5 because of the de nition of bP i n 3 :2 and the monotonicity o f s; P: We obtain thus the desired contradiction.
The next proposition shows that the bequest motive is always operative when both the interest rate and the discount factor are high enough. Proof. We will prove it by contradiction. Assume that gb; P = 0 ; then the rst order condition 2:4 and the envelope condition 2:7 imply that u 0 ĉ y b; P = R 1 , u 0 Rŝb; P + N P + u 0 Rŝb; P + N P u 0 Rŝb; P + N P ; 3.6 where the inequality comes from the assumption that R 1: Moreover, when gb; P = 0 we h a ve u 0 Rŝb; P + N P V 0 y 0; P = u 0 c y 0; P; 3.7 where the weak inequality is the corresponding rst order condition 2:6 and the equality is the envelope condition 2:5: Combining 3:6 with 3:7; we get u 0 ĉ y b; P u 0 ĉ y 0; P:
From the concavity o f u and the fact thatĉ y ; P is increasing, it follows that b 0; which is the desired contradiction.
The properties of the bequest function we h a ve just described will be extensively used in the next section in order to explore the existence and the properties of the stationary distribution of bequests in this economy.
The Distribution of Bequests
The distribution of bequests across individuals in each period is a probability measure de ned on the measurable space R + ; B where B is the ,algebra of Borel sets of R + : In this section we will show that, given a constant level P of the pension, the probability measure of bequests converges to a unique invariant or stationary probability measure ; P o n R + ; B.
In this large economy a proportion 1 , of individuals receives a zero transfer from their parents while a proportion of individuals receives a transfer governed by the function g; P. Clearly, if an individual has an altruistic parent who received the bequests b t ; then he will receive a bequest equal to gb t ; P. Hence Proof. We will show that the distribution f0g; P Proof. We will show that the distribution in the statement satis es 4. The previous corollaries tell us that, when the return R from saving is lower than N, the wealth of a dynasty o b viously decreases along time since the net return per capita from transferring wealth from one period to the following is always negative. On the other hand, a high interest rate allows a perpetually growing sequence of intervivos transfers within a dynasty formed exclusively by altruistic agents. Finally, note that these su cient conditions for having either bounded or unbounded support are independent of the pension tax P. In this section we analyze how an unanticipated permanent i n troduction of a PAYG social security a ects individuals' decisions and, thus, the distribution of bequests when the bequest motive is not operative in the long run, that is, when R 1.
Note that, when the introduction of the social security scheme takes place, savings of an old agent are xed and equal toŝ0; 0; whereas the bequests he leaves if he becomes altruistic will beb ŝ0; 0; P ; which is not necessarily equal to either g0; 0 =b ŝ0; 0; 0 or g0; P = b ŝ0; P; P : Moreover, young individuals at the moment of the policy change will select their saving according to the functionŝ; P:
In particular we will see that, when interest rates are low, there is a range of pension levels for which the unanticipated introduction of the social security system does not even a ect the distribution of bequests in the short run so that it remains degenerate at zero. However, for higher values of the interest rate, there is a threshold level of pensions above which the introduction of the social security induces a non-degenerate distribution of bequests in the short run. Such a distribution will converge in the long run to the degenerate one in accordance with Propositions 4 and 5:
Proposition 8. Assume that R 1 and that the initial distribution of bequests is the degenerate, invariant one given in Proposition 5: There exists a pension tax P such that, if the government introduces an unanticipated PAYG social security system with a pension tax level P 2 0; min fw;Pg ; then the bequest motive remains inoperative after the introduction of social security and, thus, the distribution of bequests remains degenerate at zero.
Proof. The which, from the rst order condition 2:6 ; implies thatbŝ0; 0; P = 0 for all P min fw;Pg : Therefore, the bequest motive remains inoperative after the introduction of this social security s c heme and, thus, the degenerate initial distribution of bequests is not a ected by such a n i n troduction of pensions.
The previous proposition tell us that, in order to obtain a transitory e ect on the distribution of bequests, we need that the introduction of the PAYG social security be su ciently intense, that is, the pension tax P should be su ciently high. On the other hand, we will need an interest rate higher than the implicit rate of return of the social security system in order to prevent the present value of lifetime income of the descendants from increasing after the introduction of social security. Note in this respect that w w , P + N P R if and only if R N : In this situation, altruistic parents will react by returning part of the pension they receive to their descendants. However, the sons of non-altruistic parents will not enjoy such a compensation and this would give rise to a non-degenerate distribution of bequests and, thus, the PAYG system would be the source of some transitory inequality o f w ealth.
Before stating the precise result, we need to establish the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Let P 1 P 2 and assume that gb; P 1 = gb; P 2 = 0 ; then sb; P 1 ŝb; P 2 andĉ y b; P 1 ĉ y b; P 2 if R N;
Proof. Combine the rst order condition 2:4 and the envelope condition 2:7 evaluated at b 0 = 0 to get u 0 w + b , P , s = R u 0 Rs+ N P :
Implicitly di erentiating the previous equation, we obtain ds dP = , u 00 w + b , P , s + RN u 00 Rs+ N P u 00 w + b , P , s + R 2 u 00 Rs+ N P 0:
It is straightforward to check that ds dP 1 i f R N:Since c y = w + b , P , s ; it follows that dc y dP 0 if R N :
Proposition 9. Assume that N R 1= and that the initial distribution of bequests is the degenerate, invariant one given in Proposition 5. There exists a pension P 0 such that the bequest motive becomes operative when the social security is introduced with a pension level P 2 , P ; w . In this case, the distribution of bequests becomes non-degenerate when social security is introduced and it converges back to the degenerate distribution.
Proof. Before introducing the social security s c heme the bequests are zero and u 0 Rŝ0; 0 u 0 ĉ y 0; 0; as follows from the condition 2:6 and the envelope condition 2:5 when b 0 = 0: Assume that b 0 =bŝ0; 0; P = 0 and de ne the threshold pension P as the one that solves the following equation:
u 0 Rŝ0; 0 + P = u 0 ĉ y 0; P :
Such a threshold is non-negative since u is strictly concave andĉ y 0; P is nonincreasing in P for R N whenever b 0 = 0; as follows from Lemma 3: Moreover P w as a consequence of the Inada conditions at the origin. Then, u 0 Rŝ0; 0 + P u 0 ĉ y 0; P;
for all P P, and this violates conditions 2:6 and 2:7 : Therefore, the bequest motive should become operative b 0 =bŝ0; 0; P 0 after the introduction of a pension at a level higher than P. Hence, u 0 Rŝ0; 0 , b 0 + P = u 0 ĉ y b 0 ; P; since u is strictly concave andĉ y ; P is strictly monotonically increasing : Note that the saving of the agents who were old at the moment of the introduction of social security is given byŝ0; 0: Finally, as it follows from Propositions 4 and 5, the distribution of bequests after the introduction of the pension converges to the degenerate one since lim i!1 gb i ; P = 0 when b i+1 = gb i ; P and b 0 = 0 .
According to the previous proposition the introduction of a permanent PAYG social security s c heme could induce a non-degenerate distribution of bequests in the short run. Such an e ect is transitory since bequests tend to zero in the long run even within dynasties displaying an in nite sequence of altruistic individuals when R 1. Needless to say, the non-degenerate distribution of bequests in the short run is associated with a corresponding non-degenerate distribution of consumptions and savings through their respective policy functions.
Long Run E ects of Social Security when the Bequest Motive is Always Operative
In this section we will explore how a permanent marginal change in the social security tax a ects both the bequest that individuals leave to their descendants and the long run distribution of bequest when the bequest motive is always operative for altruistic agents. This situation occurs when R 1 and, thus, the stationary distribution of bequests is non-degenerate in this case. If the bequest motive were non-random and always operative within a dynasty, then individuals would adjust their bequests in order to completely o set the change in the pension. In fact, individuals would only care about the net intergenerational transfer b , P from parents to each descendant. This means that when P increases, the bequest b should increase by the same amount. However, if the altruism is random, individuals could react by decreasing their saving when the pension level increases. In fact, this is the typical reaction of non-altruistic individuals since they only care about the total saving s + P:As we will prove in this section, when the probability of being altruistic is low, then such a reduction in the amount o f s a vings could encompass a reduction of the bequests left by the few individuals that turn to be altruistic.
The next proposition applies for economies populated basically by altruistic individuals.
Proposition 10. Let R 1 and P 1 P 2 : There exists a 0 such that gb; P 1 g b; P 2 for all 2 ;1. Moreover, lim Proof. For = 1 the result follows directly from Barro 1974 since the altruistic agents completely o set the e ects of social security b y means of adjustments in the amount of bequests within the dynasty when the bequests motive is always operative, i.e., when R 1. In fact, from 2:5 and 2:6 ; we h a ve that u 0 Rŝb; P 1 , N g b; P 1 + N P 1 = u 0 w , P 1 + gb; P 1 ,ŝgb; P 1 ; P 1 ; when the pensions were at level P 1 and the bequest motive is operative, whereas when pensions are set at level P 2 we h a ve u 0 Rŝb; P 2 , N g b; P 2 + N P 2 = u 0 w , P 2 + gb; P 2 ,ŝgb; P 2 ; P 2 :
Therefore, these two equations are compatible whenŝb; P 1 =ŝb; P 2 ; gb; P 1 = gb; P 2 + P 1 , P 2 ; andŝgb; P 1 ; P 1 = sgb; P 2 ; P 2 : By continuity, i f is close to 1, then intergenerational transfers increase when social security i s i n troduced.
Note that the implication of the previous proposition is that the stationary average bequest of this economy increases with the pension level when the probability of being altruistic is high enough and the altruistic agents leave positive bequests R 1 : Moreover, if we divide the population of the economy into two groups of individuals: the ones that receive bequests and the ones that do not, then all the values of the discrete support of the stationary distribution of bequests for the latter group su er an increase. Obviously, the bequests for the former group remains unaltered at zero. This means that the expected wealth gap at birth between descendants of non-altruistic parents and descendants of altruistic ones increases with the pension in this scenario. A nal obvious implication of the previous proposition is that the distribution of bequests associated to a lower pension tax is dominated by the distribution with a higher tax in the sense of rst order stochastic dominance. This is so because the probability of having bequests lower than a given value b decreases as the pension P increases for all b 0 see Hadar and Russell, 1969. It is possible however to nd examples in which the increase in the pension results in a reduction of the expected di erence in wealth at birth between the two population groups we have just de ned. The previous proposition tells us that, in order to nd such examples, we need an operative bequest motive and, simultaneously, a low value of . Moreover, if the individuals' preferences exhibit decreasing increasing absolute risk aversion see Arrow, 1970 , and Pratt, 1964, we will need to impose that the gross return R from savings is higher lower than the gross rate N of population growth. Note that, since individuals are non-altruistic with a very high probability, their decisions concerning their pro le of consumption are mostly driven by the present value of their lifetime income as they abstract from bequests considerations. If R N;the increase in the pension P translates into a decrease in the present value of the lifetime income , w + b , P + N P R of all agents. This in turn makes agents more less risk averse under decreasing increasing absolute risk aversion. Therefore, the few altruistic parents of this economy would react by decreasing increasing the bequest left to their sons. This is so because the increase decrease in risk aversion induces agents to decrease increase the di erence between the old consumption corresponding to the event o f being altruistic and the one corresponding to the event of being sel sh. Of course, the opposite argument applies when R N : The following two propositions formalize the previous discussion.
Proposition 11. Let R 1 and P 0: There exists a 0 such that @gb;P @P 0 for all 2 0; whenever any of the following two conditions is satis ed:
i R N and the index of absolute risk aversion of u; R A = ,u 00 =u 0 ; is strictly decreasing.
ii R N and the index of absolute risk aversion of u is strictly increasing.
Proof. See the appendix.
Even if the probability of being altruistic is very low, an increase in the pension could trigger an increase in the bequests left by altruistic agents. To get such a result we just need to assume the opposite to Proposition 11 and apply exactly the same reasoning.
Proposition 12. Let R 1 and P 0: There exists a 0 such that @gb;P @P 0 for all 2 0; whenever any of the following two conditions is satis ed:
i R N and the index of absolute risk aversion of u is strictly decreasing. ii R N and the index of absolute risk aversion of u is strictly increasing.
Proof. Obvious from the proof of Proposition 11.
Concerning the distribution of bequests and, thus, of consumptions and savings, we see that, in the scenario depicted by the assumptions of Proposition 11; an increase in the pension P results in a reduction of the bequests left by all the altruistic agents so that the expected wealth gap at birth between children of altruistic parents and children of egoist ones decreases with the pension level. Note that this is in sharp contrast to the situation where the probability of being altruistic was su ciently high since there the increase in the pension level widened the gap of initial wealth between these two population groups. Moreover, under the assumptions of Proposition 11, the probability o f h a ving bequests lower than a given value b increases as the pension P increases for all b 0. Clearly, this means that the distribution of bequests with a lower social security tax dominates the one with a higher tax in the sense of rst degree stochastic dominance.
In order to illustrate the previous two propositions, we can consider the Example Moreover, it is immediate to see that the limit of the upper bound b is strictly decreasing increasing in P when R N;which agrees with parts i of Propositions 11 and 12 since the logarithmic utility exhibits a strictly decreasing index of absolute risk aversion:
We conclude this section with some welfare considerations. It is obvious that the welfare of the generation that was old at the time when the pension increased was enhanced by such a policy change. On the other hand, if we were interested in the steady state e ects on welfare, we should restrict our attention to the expected utility of the newborns under the stationary distribution of bequests. Note that, when the probability of being altruistic is very low, the welfare of individuals depends basically on the present value of their lifetime income. The e ects of social security on the expected utility of newborns are generally ambiguous as it usually happens in OLG models. However, in the scenario depicted by part i of Proposition 11; we can say that the ex-ante welfare of a newborn is reduced since the present v alue of non-inherited lifetime income , w , P + N P R decreases and the distribution of bequests becomes less desirable as a consequence of the shift in terms of rst order stochastic dominance. The opposite holds in the scenario of part i of Proposition 12 and, thus, the ex-ante welfare of a newborn increases in such a case. Concerning parts ii of Propositions 11 and 12; the results are ambiguous since the present value of lifetime income and the shift on the bequests distribution have opposite e ects on welfare.
Conclusions
In this paper we have characterized the distribution of bequests in an economy in which a PAYG social security system is present. We have analyzed both the transitory and the permanent e ects on this distribution caused by changes in the pension tax. We h a ve shown that the e ects of social security on the distribution of bequests depends crucially on the importance of the bequest motive. If individuals are most likely altruists, then the introduction of social security increases the size of altruistic bequests. On the other hand, when individuals are most likely nonaltruistic, then the introduction of social security could reduce the those bequests under some conditions on the attitude of individuals toward risk and the relative returns associated with private saving and social security.
In contrast to our results, if the distribution of bequests were generated by uncertain lifetimes, then an increase in the pension tax would result unambiguously in an smaller wealth gap between the individuals who have received a positive bequests and the ones that have not. This is so because social security acts as a public annuity which reduces the size of accidental bequests see Abel, 1985 .
On the other hand, a non-degenerate distribution of bequests could also arise when there are two types of dynasties, the altruistic and the sel sh ones as in Michel and Pestieau, 1998 . In this case individuals know when they are young if they are altruistic or not and, hence, they do not face any kind of risk. Obviously, an increase in the social security tax will always increase the bequest left by all the altruistic agents and this will also increase the wealth gap between the two t ypes of dynasties.
We have focused on the unfunded social security system since, as we have seen, it is a system for which a quite rich plethora of results arises depending on the parametric assumptions of the model. If we had considered instead a fully funded social security system, the marginal changes in the social security tax would translate immediately int o a c hange by the same amount in the voluntary savings. Therefore, the bequest left by an individual would remain unchanged since this bequest only depends on his e ective s a ving regardless of whether it is compulsory or voluntary.
Finally, w e point out that it could be interesting to characterize the distribution of bequests and the corresponding impact of social security i f w e i n troduced uncertainty on alternative sources of intended bequests. Among the di erent approaches, we mention the model of joy-of-giving" in which parents derive direct utility from the size of the bequest they leave Yaari, 1965 or the model of strategic altruism" in which i n tergenerational transfers arise as payments for services provided by c hildren Bernheim et al., 1985 . We leave this for future research.
A. Appendix A.2 which is the limit of the rst order condition of an altruistic individual when tends to zero. Note that the Inada conditions on the utility function u prevents the limit of V 0 a s; P from tending to in nity. This is so because V 0 a s; P has to beequal to Ru 0 ĉ y b 0 ; P; as follows from combining 2:5 ; 2:6 and 2:7. 
